Pour demander une indemnité de départ d’un an… il faut être un employé

Par Me Paul-Matthieu Grondin

Dans Vandrish c. OF Internet Technology consulting Inc., une décision récente de la Cour supérieure, on demande une indemnité de départ d’un an pour congédiement déguisé.

La défense est à l’effet que la demanderesse n’est pas une employée. Celle-ci, dont le travail consistait à développer, établir et maintenir des relations d’affaires avec des clients, avait toujours été payée selon le mode du contrat de service, auquel on peut mettre fin beaucoup plus facilement qu’au contrat de travail.

La juge établit les critères bien connus pour déterminer si on se trouve devant une entreprise individuelle ou un employé :

[39]        An employment contract is defined as follows in article 2085 of the Civil Code of Quebec (CCQ):

A contract of employment is a contract by which a person, the employee, undertakes, for a limited time and for remuneration, to do work under the direction or control of another person, the employer.

[40]        A contract of employment can be for a fixed or indeterminate term. In the latter case, the employer who wishes to terminate the contract must give reasonable notice to the employee, unless there is a serious cause to terminate the contract[13].

[41]        The Courts[14] have identified revealing factors as to the existence of a relationship of subordination, including:

41.1.   The mandatory presence at work;

41.2.   The respect of a work schedule;

41.3.   The control of the quantity and quality of the work;

41.4.   Imposing methods to perform the work;

41.5.   The deduction of taxes by the employer;

41.6.   The declared status in fiscal declarations;

41.7.   The exclusivity of services for the employer.

[42]        A contract of enterprise or for services is defined as follows in article 2098 CCQ:

A contract of enterprise or for services is a contract by which a person, the contractor or the provider of services, as the case may be, undertakes to another person, the client, to carry out physical or intellectual work or to supply a service, for a price which the client binds himself to pay to him.

Et, à  l’évidence, dans le cas qui nous occupe, la demanderesse n’était pas une employée et ne peut donc pas demander d’indemnité de départ, ce que les parties semblent avoir clairement indiqué dans leurs relations contractuelles et dans leurs correspondances. Par contre, malgré ce qui paraît comme l’évidence, il faut aller plus loin pour conclure de la nature juridique de la relation. Voici la juge à ce sujet :

[54]        Although Vandrish had working conditions that could be, in some aspects, compared to other employees of OFI, this does not constitute a determining factor in concluding to the existence of an employment contract. 

[55]        More particularly:

55.1.   Vandrish performed her work mostly from her house in Ontario while employees were mainly working from the Montréal office[29]. She was not present in a supervised workplace and would determine her own work schedule[30]. These facts militate against the existence of a relationship of subordination[31];

55.2.   While Vandrish participated in meetings and submitted invoices for her work, and even considering that she remained very available to answer any requests, she was not subordinate to OFI for the planning of her working time;

55.3.   While there was an agreement as to invoicing for a certain number of vacation weeks per year, she decided when she would take her vacations without the prior approval of Defendant, which also shows a lack of control from Defendant over Plaintiff[32];

55.4.   Defendant made no deduction at the source for the work done by Plaintiff;

55.5.   While Plaintiff worked essentially for Defendant, there was no exclusivity of service. Technomark also invoiced a small honorarium every year for work done for a charity[33]. In addition, in March 2020, when Vandrish proposed the new working conditions, she stated she would « try to find other revenue”[34] on the days she did not work for OFI;

55.6.   The allocation she received for her car and other expenses was invoiced to Defendant through Technomark;

55.7.   As to the methods to perform the work, it appears that Vandrish would decide how to perform her work, which included working with the tools and systems of Defendant.  

[56]        In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that Vandrish has not met her burden of proving that there existed a relationship of subordination and that she was an employee of OFI.

[57]        She decided to perform her work under a contract for services and remain an independent contractor for specific purposes and to her benefit. All of the attributes of such a contract are met. Therefore, it is not a sui generis contract.

[58]        This conclusion suffices to reject Plaintiff’s claim in constructive dismissal and damages. That being said, even if the Court had concluded that Vandrish was an employee of Defendant, Vandrish’s claim would still have been rejected for the following reasons.

Bien qu’elle n’ait – de ses propres mots – pas eu à le faire, la juge nous explique également que si la demanderesse avait été une employée, la situation qu’elle a vécu ne se définissait tout de même pas d’un congédiement déguisé, ce qui permet d’enrichir le corpus jurisprudentiel à ce sujet.